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1. Introduction 
Polanyi (2001[1944]) described the social history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
as the result of a double movement. One of these movements was an unprecedented 
growth of market mechanisms, while the other was the parallel development of “a network 
of measures and policies (…) designed to check the action of the market relative to labour, 
land, and money” (p. 79). This process, he added, “may happen in a great variety of ways, 
democratic and aristocratic, constitutionalist and authoritarian” (p. 259). Even today, 
however, there is no consensus on the impact of the type of political regime on the 
development of social policy. Initially, one would expect the expansion of suffrage and the 
advancement of democracy to have a positive effect, as suggested by Lindert (2004) and 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008). However, there are also examples of social policy being 
developed under nondemocratic governments, such as that of Bismarck’s Germany. 
Indeed, Mulligan et al. (2010) and Cutler and Johnson (2004) take the view that 
dictatorships also have incentives to increase social spending, whether for reasons of 
economic efficiency or to achieve political legitimacy. In Spain, the development of social 
policy has taken place in the midst of a tumultuous political history, experiencing periods 
of census suffrage, universal male suffrage, dictatorship and democracy. This has made 
Spain into an interesting case study. Certainly, Spain’s most important difference with 
respect to Western Europe emerged after World War II. At that time, democracy became 
well established in most European countries, while Franco’s dictatorship in Spain lasted 
until 1976/77. According to Tusell (2005), “if there exists a crucial break in the history of 
Spain, it is the one that occurred [during the Francoist dictatorship] after the civil war” (p. 
11). One must ask, therefore, how these specific historical characteristics affected the 
development of social policy, and what lessons can be drawn from the Spanish case about 
the relation between the type of political regime and growth in social spending.   
To answer these questions, this study has examined the relation between the political 
regime and growth in social spending in Spain in the period 1850-2000 by means of a time 
series analysis. The Spanish case is interesting because, as noted earlier, the country went 
through numerous changes of political regime between 1850 and 2000. In addition, the 
advancement of democracy was not linear. One can find democratic and dictatorial periods 
with relatively low levels of income and social spending (such as the dictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera in the 1920s and the democratic experience of the Second Republic in the 1930s) 
and democratic and dictatorial periods with relatively high levels of income and social 
spending (such as the last decade of Franco’s dictatorship and today’s democracy). This 
provides variability for the econometric analysis. In addition, an analysis of social 
spending from the sort of long-term perspective proposed here is interesting for a number 
of reasons. The development of social policy is, in fact, a long-term process. In the Spanish 
case, as in the case of many European countries, the origins of social policy can be traced 
back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also, this process typically has a 
cumulative effect. The legislative momentum of a period often carries over into subsequent 
periods. If the historical perspective is not taken into account, it is easy to give credit to 
the wrong regime. However, most of the quantitative studies on the determinants of social 
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spending focus on shorter and typically more recent periods of time. Espuelas (2012), for 
example, found that southern European dictatorships had a negative impact on social 
spending in 1950-80, using panel data for 15 European countries. The main counterfactual 
in this case was the experience of other democratic European countries. Would these 
results remain if we analyse the impact of regime change within the same country across 
time? 
The results obtained here indicate that democracy had a positive effect both on the levels 
of social spending and on its long-term growth trend. Indeed, the arrival of democracy in 
1931 initiated a process of modernisation in the patterns of social spending, moving from a 
traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels 
of social spending), which was interrupted by Franco’s dictatorship. At the same time, the 
effect of left-wing parties was more significant in the 1930s (prior to the Keynesian 
consensus) and in the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups 
were systematically ignored) than in today’s democracy. The paper is organised as follows. 
The next section gives an overview of the main theories addressing the relation between 
democracy, political parties and the welfare state. Section 3 outlines the history of social 
policy in Spain. Section 4 analyses the impact of the type of political regime on social 
spending and section 5 sets out the conclusions.   
 
2. Democracy, Political Parties and the Welfare State  
Early studies on the origins of the welfare state attributed its emergence and subsequent 
development to changes caused by economic growth and industrialisation, which 
generated new social needs at the same time as the traditional social protection systems of 
rural societies were being eroded. In this context, it became necessary to find new 
solutions, which involved rising levels of state interventionism (Kerr et al. 1964, Pampel 
and Weiss 1983). Wilensky (1975), in fact, considers that economic growth and the ageing 
of the population (one of the principal by-products of economic growth) are the most 
important factors to account for the growth in social spending in advanced countries. 
Other studies, however, have accorded greater importance to the role of political factors to 
understand the differences among countries with similar income levels and demographic 
structures. According to Lindert (2004), for instance, the gradual expansion of voting 
rights had a positive effect on the growth of social spending between 1880 and 1930. 
Bringing low-income groups into the political process led to increased political support for 
redistributive policies. In a similar vein, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) and Espuelas 
(2012) contend that democracy had a positive effect on social spending in Europe and in 
several developing countries in the period after World War II.  
To the extent that the expansion of suffrage to all citizens shifted the median voter 
downward, these findings are consistent with the Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis. 
In democracy, one would also expect a convergence between political parties toward the 
preferences of the median voter (Downs 1957). However, political parties do not always 
behave as the perfect agents of voters. They typically have their own interests and 
preferences, and often have the ability to set the political agenda. When they choose which 
laws and proposals are debated and which ones are not, they can push the result (at least 
in part) away from the preferences of the median voter and closer to their own preferences 
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(Krehbiel 2004). This means that if there are political parties ideologically committed to 
the development of social policy, they can influence the political agenda by prioritising 
social issues, and vice versa. If there are parties opposed to social spending growth, they 
can have an influence in the opposite direction. Congleton and Bose (2010), indeed, take 
the view that the growth in social spending that occurred in many developed countries 
between 1960 and 1985 can be explained in part by ideological changes over time. 
However, the theories that have, doubtless, paid the most attention to the role of political 
parties in the development of social policy are the so-called power-resource theories. 
According to these theories, democracy is positive for social policy, but it is seen as a 
necessary condition, not a sufficient one. For democracy to have a positive effect, the 
working class must take advantage of the opportunities afforded by democracy, organising 
in trade unions and strong political parties (Korpi 1983). Hicks (1999) contends that the 
mobilisation of the working class did, in fact, play a key role in the initial stages of social 
policy. By 1920, only those countries that had a strong labour movement had introduced 
three of the four most important types of social insurance: workplace accident 
compensation, old-age pensions, health insurance and unemployment insurance1. 
However, Hicks also notes that the role of social democracy became blurred after the 
Second World War, when the Keynesian consensus prevailed. Only in the nineteen-
seventies and eighties, when that consensus began to break apart, did social democracy 
again resume a prominent role in the defence of the welfare state within some countries. 
Wilensky (1981), however, maintains that Catholic parties, more than social democratic 
parties, were the greatest proponents of the development of social policy after the Second 
World War, although Manow and Van Kersbergen (2009) point out that this was the case 
primarily when they had to complete electorally against social democratic parties. 
Shifting the focus slightly, Bradley et al. (2003) contend that if, instead of analysing 
aggregate levels of social spending, one examines the ability of social policy to reduce 
inequality (after taxes and transfers), then left-wing governments show a clearly positive 
effect on social policy. The reason is that in countries dominated by Christian democrats, 
social benefits may be relatively generous, but social policy tends to reproduce market 
inequalities. By contrast, in countries with a greater prevalence of left-wing governments, 
social policy is more redistributive. These results, in turn, are consistent with the three 
types of welfare regimes set out by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
However, apart from debates over the ideology of the party in government, there is no 
consensus on the role of democracy per se. Mulligan et al. (2010), for instance, find that 
democracies are not more active than dictatorships in promoting growth in social security 
spending. Indeed, they take the view that political institutions are irrelevant in this sense. 
In line with Wilensky (1975), they claim that the really important variables are economic 
growth and the ageing of the population. Either of these variables would translate into 
growth in social security spending independently of the mechanisms of political 
participation. The authors do not explain the alternative mechanisms that could come into 
action, but they suggest that it would be because of the efforts of pressure groups or for 
efficiency reasons. According to Sala-i-Martin (1996), for example, pensions improve the 
                                                          
1 Hicks (1999) considers that a strong labour movement exists when at least 20% of the labour force is 
affiliated with a trade union or when the workers’ parties (socialists, social democrats, labour party or 
communists) receive over 20% of the votes in elections. 
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average stock of human capital in the economy, thereby generating positive externalities 
on economic growth and productivity. This would explain why both dictatorships and 
democracies have promoted their expansion. Cutler and Johnson (2004), for their part, do 
not deny the importance of political factors, but they also think that dictatorships can 
stimulate the development of social policy in order to achieve political legitimacy and hold 
onto power.  
This same idea has been echoed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), who nonetheless give 
more attention to the incentive problems behind it. In a dictatorship, all formal political 
power, or de jure power, is in the hands of the governing elite. Only if the citizens are able 
to solve their problems of collective action and organise successfully can they achieve a 
certain de facto power that might pose a real threat to the government. At that point, the 
government will have incentives to make social concessions and maintain itself in power. 
However, as all de jure power is in the hands of the government, it will have no reason to 
keep its social promises as soon as the opposition demobilises and its de facto power 
diminishes. If citizens know this, they will not put trust in the government’s social 
promises and they will refuse to demobilise. In other words, even if the government is 
interested in making social concessions, for these concessions to be carried out, it will have 
to find a way to solve its commitment problems and make credible promises. But even in 
this case, the levels of redistribution in a dictatorship are lower than in a democracy. The 
main reason is that the de facto power of the citizens is temporary and, therefore, the 
levels of redistribution will only partially reflect the preferences of the majority of the 
population.2 
From a historical perspective, the package of measures approved by Bismarck in Germany 
would be a typical example of this sort of behaviour. Bismarck himself acknowledged in his 
address in the Reichstag in 1881 that the measures were partly a response to “the excesses 
of the socialists”3. In the terms used by Acemoglu and Robinson, the de facto power of the 
German labour movement had succeeded in forcing social concessions from the 
government. Power-resource theories have focused their attention primarily on the role of 
left-wing parties in democracy. However, following the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005), the role of the labour movement (and generally of any other opposition movement) 
could be equally important in non-democratic contexts. As shall be seen below, this is 
actually what is suggested by a number of qualitative studies on the history of Spanish 
social policy. 
 
3. History of Social Policy in Spain 
At the close of the nineteenth century, a portion of the Spanish political elite began to 
express support for the development of social policy. They thought that it could be an 
effective means to safeguard political stability amid the advance of the labour movement 
and industrialisation. The publication of the encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891 (in which 
the Church acknowledged that private charity was not enough to solve social problems) 
and the package of social measures applied by Bismarck in Germany served as model and 
                                                          
2 The assumption here, which is also made by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), is that the elite is a 
minoritarian group that is relatively wealthy and, therefore, opposed to redistributive policies. 
3 Cited in Rimlinger (1971), p. 112. 
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inspiration. At the same time, the introduction of universal male suffrage in Spain in 1890 
aroused fear in some political sectors. Cánovas del Castillo (who was prime minister 
several times between 1875 and 1897) was himself convinced that there could not be 
“universal suffrage without having a little sooner or a little later the practicing of state 
socialism” (p.30). This is why he saw Bismarck’s social policy as “a farsighted conception of 
the political necessities created by the impotence of the old economic dogmas, combined 
with (…) the agitation of the proletariat and the existing political system [universal male 
suffrage]” (p. 38). In that context, the government decided to create the Commission of 
Social Reforms in 1883. Its most important work was the so-called “Spoken and Written 
Information (1889-1893)”, a detailed study on the situation of the working class that 
compiled a great deal of information and implicitly acknowledged the existence of the 
“social problem”. However, the effort was not translated into any specific measure. In the 
early twentieth century, social protection in Spain still depended on private charity and 
the public system of poor-relief instituted with the Law of 1849. 
The path toward social insurance was opened with the Law of Occupational Accidents of 
1900. The impact of this measure, however, was very limited. Benefits legally set by the 
government were very low and enterprises often failed to fulfil their commitments due to 
the lack of inspection (Silvestre and Pons, 2010). Shortly afterwards, in 1908, the 
government set up the National Institute of Social Insurance (INP in Spanish, for Instituto 
Nacional de Previsión). The INP was charged with managing the so-called Retiro Obrero, 
or “Worker’s Retirement”, a state-subsidized, voluntary system for old-age pensions. This 
new programme, however, also grew very slowly. In 1918, the total number of insured 
persons stood at only 78,166, representing in the vicinity of 1% of the labour force (Elu, 
2010). After World War I, social legislation received a new impetus. From 1917, there was 
intense social unrest as a consequence of the economic imbalances caused by the war and 
the contagious effect of the Russian Revolution. The government tried to regain political 
stability through a policy of social concessions, and became more willing to support 
compulsory insurance. In 1917, the government organized a Conference of Social 
Insurances, where it made a commitment to create a comprehensive system of social 
insurances (which were supposed to include insurance covering occupational accidents, 
old-age, illness, maternity and unemployment). A scheme for unemployment insurance 
and a scheme for health and maternity insurance were discussed both in the INP and the 
parliament between 1917 and 1923. The socialist party (which in 1910 had won its first 
seat in parliament) demanded in its parliamentary speeches that the government fulfil its 
social promises. However, the only program that came to fruition was the Retiro Obrero 
Obligatorio, or “Compulsory Worker’s Retirement”, a compulsory old-age pension system 
created in 1919 (Elu 2010, Pons and Vilar 2014). 
Even though Cánovas del Castillo was convinced that universal suffrage would lead 
inevitably to socialism, the progress of social policy in Spain was very slow during the 
period of the Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923). According to Guillén (1990), corruption, 
electoral fraud and caciquismo (a system of patronage and dominance by local bosses that 
was particularly widespread in rural areas) enabled the political elite to ignore bottom-up 
demands, especially in the years before World War I. From this point of view, the few 
social achievements that occurred before 1914 would primarily have been top-down 
initiatives coming from the political elite itself. Other authors, by contrast, take a more 
nuanced view and contend that this top-down shift in attitude cannot be explained without 
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the “Disaster of ‘98” (the political crisis occurring after the independence of Cuba and the 
Philippines) and the gradual growth of the labour movement (Gabriel 2004, Castillo and 
Montero 2008). However, even at times of social unrest (such as after World War I), the 
government was unable to keep its social promises.   
In 1923, after the military coup and the installation of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera 
(1923-1930), the momentum of the preceding years ground to a halt. The proposed 
schemes for unemployment and maternity insurance were completely abandoned. 
However, pre-existing insurances, such as workplace accident insurance and old-age 
pensions, continued to operate; and subsidies for large families were created in 1927, a 
policy that was consistent with Catholic social morality and the influence acquired by the 
Church during the dictatorship (Velarde 1990). Indeed, the dictatorship strove for social 
pacification through a combination of repression and the establishment of corporatist 
formulas. The CNT, which was the anarchist trade union and the largest at the time, was 
persecuted, but at the same time joint committees were created to try to regulate collective 
bargaining with the participation of the UGT, the socialist trade union (Pérez Ledesma 
1990). With the advent of the Second Republic (1931-36), which is viewed by Linz et al. 
(2005) as the first truly democratic period in the history of Spain, social legislation 
received a new impetus. Progress was particularly striking in the first two-year period, 
when there was a socialist presence in the government (Samaniego 1988). The 
Constitution of 1931 recognised the right to social security. Between 1931 and 1932, 
maternity insurance (which delivered maternity-leave benefits and healthcare during 
childbirth for working women) came into effect; a state-subsidised system of voluntary 
unemployment insurance was set up; occupational accident insurance was made 
compulsory4 and coverage was extended to agriculture. Also, a plan was devised to unify 
social insurances, with the aim of creating a single system of social security encompassing 
maternity and old-age insurances, which were already in existence, along with new 
insurances covering illness, disability, orphans and widows. Finally, the government put 
heavy investment into public works to combat unemployment, especially in rural areas, 
and strove to carry out an agrarian reform to reduce social unrest in the countryside and 
to consolidate the democratisation process initiated in 1931. However, the outbreak of the 
civil war (1936-39) thwarted these latter plans. 
After the civil war, Franco’s dictatorship combatted social unrest through a combination of 
severe political repression and a precarious social safety net, which was fundamentally 
targeted at low and medium-income industrial workers. Most of the social insurance 
schemes created before the civil war continued to operate, but the dictatorship abolished 
the voluntary unemployment insurance and shelved the Republican project of social 
insurance unification. New insurances, however, were also created. In 1938, for example, 
before the end of the civil war, a family allowance called Subsidio Familiar was 
introduced. This offered bonus payments to all (male) wage-earners based on the number 
of children (starting with the second child). The family allowance was largely the result of 
the anti-feminist and pro-population-growth ideology of the dictatorship (Espuelas 2012). 
Retirement pensions were overhauled in 1939, becoming fixed-sum pensions. Rural 
workers were initially excluded, but they were reincorporated shortly afterwards, in 1943. 
Disability and widows’ pensions, for their part, were introduced as a specific case of old-
                                                          
4 Before the reform in the nineteen-thirties, companies were free to choose between paying benefits for 
occupational accidents directly to their workers or joining an employers’ mutual insurance scheme. 
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age pensions in 1947 and 1956, respectively (note, however, that these benefits had 
already been envisaged in the Republican project for unified social insurances, in 1936).    
In 1942-44, a compulsory health insurance scheme (SOE in Spanish, for Seguro 
Obligatorio de Enfermedad), was set up and became a key piece in the dictatorship’s 
political propaganda (Pons and Vilar 2014). At first, coverage was limited to industrial 
workers. Agricultural permanent and casual workers were not incorporated into the SOE 
until 1953 and 1958, respectively. Occupational health insurance, for its part, was not put 
into operation until 1947, even though the framework law had originally been approved in 
1936, in the second republic. However, the insurance that lagged the most was 
unemployment insurance, which was not instituted until 1961 (Espuelas 2013). In 
addition to this network of independent social insurance schemes, the dictatorship also 
created the so-called Labour Mutualism (or Mutualismo Laboral in Spanish). Formally, it 
was a series of mutual associations financed and administered by employers and workers, 
grouped into branches or sectors of activity. In practice, however, Labour Mutualism was 
tightly regulated and overseen by the state (setting benefit levels, access conditions, the 
amount of employers’ and workers’ contributions, etc.). This turned it de facto into a 
parallel system to the official social insurance schemes (De la Calle 1994). 
This piecemeal approach started to be corrected with the Social Security reform of 1967. 
Existing social programmes were brought together under a single, more streamlined social 
security system, and coverage was extended to all wage earners (instead of limiting it only 
to low and medium-income workers). However, Spanish social policy continued to 
marginalise the population without stable ties to the labour market; and the funding of 
social security continued to rely on employers’ and workers’ compulsory contributions 
(with almost no public funding) during the entirety of the dictatorship. In spite of the 
limitations, social spending began to grow rapidly after the 1967 reforms. This increase 
also coincided with a period of rapid growth in the Spanish economy. According to 
Rodríguez Cabrero (2004), the development of social policy in this period was “the 
necessary response to late Fordism (…) and to an urbanising society” (p. 76). To the extent 
that this response was a necessary one, it follows that the dictatorship was not a 
significant obstacle to the development of social policy. Guillén (2000) went slightly 
further. According to her, Francoist leaders pushed for social insurances to improve the 
regime’s political image, and in some cases (such as that of health insurance), the 
dictatorship was even more effective than democracy when it came to ignoring pressure 
groups that opposed compulsory insurance (such as employers, insurers and medical 
professionals). 
Navarro (2000), by contrast, contends the political repression of the Francoist dictatorship 
was particularly severe on the labour movement and low-income groups in general, halting 
the development of social policy. Comín (2010), indeed, considers that dictatorship and the 
welfare state are incompatible concepts and that the development of the welfare state 
requires some kind of social pact. Social dialogue, in fact, did play a crucial role in the 
transition to democracy. In 1977, the Moncloa Pacts were signed against a backdrop of 
acute economic crisis. Representatives of workers, employers and the main political parties 
agreed to moderate wage demands and to accept policies geared toward macroeconomic 
stability and the control of inflation in return for greater social protection, progressive 
fiscal reform and the consolidation of political freedoms. The Moncloa Pacts were crucial 
for the consolidation of democracy and economic stability. But in addition, the introduction 
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of income tax in 1977 broke one of the most important barriers that the dictatorship had 
held in place against the development of social policy. From then on, rising government 
subsidies were allocated to social security institutions (which had previously been funded 
almost exclusively through compulsory contributions from employers and workers). 
Between 1981 and 1986, access to healthcare was made universal. In 1982, welfare 
benefits for disabled persons improved dramatically and in 1990, new non-contributory 
benefits for old age and disability were introduced. Also in the nineteen-nineties, the 
governments of Spain’s autonomous communities gradually introduced minimum income 
programmes for low-income families. 
All of this represented a gradual improvement in social provision and it permitted 
coverage to be expanded to sectors that do not have stable ties to the labour market 
(although the levels of generosity of the non-contributory benefits lagged far behind those 
of contributory benefits). Despite the advancements, however, there were moments at 
which the development of social policy appeared to decelerate during democracy too. One 
example is provided by the years of the so-called industrial restructuring, in the nineteen-
eighties. Another comes with the years after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-
93, when economic policy was primarily targeted at controlling the public deficit and 
inflation. However, it would be precipitate to conclude that the consolidation of democracy 
slowed the growth in social spending. In fact, from an analysis of the qualitative 
information available, one can find examples of progress and stagnation in social 
legislation during democratic periods and dictatorial ones alike. To be more conclusive, a 
more systematic analysis needs to be carried out. 
 
4. Political Institutions and Social Spending in Spain 
4.1. Data and Variables 
The aim of this section is to analyse the impact of the type of political regime on social 
spending in Spain, by means of a time series analysis. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
public social spending in Spain between 1850 and 2000 as a percentage of GDP. The data 
come from Espuelas (2013), and fits the OECD’s definitions of social spending. As can be 
seen, social spending in Spain remained practically stagnant with minor fluctuations until 
the First World War. At that point, a mild period of growth began (after a peak in 1919) 
and this did not stop during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. In 1931, a rapid growth 
in social spending occurred after the advent of the Second Republic; while social spending 
remained stagnant between 1945 and 1965, during Franco’s dictatorship. Subsequently, a 
new period of growth in social spending began in 1966/67; and it continued to be very rapid 
during the transition to democracy, until it finally began to stabilise at relatively high 
levels from 1993 onwards. 
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Figure 1. Public social spending in Spain (1850-2000) as a % of GDP 
 
Source: Espuelas (2013). Note: The series includes social spending by Spain’s central government (and its 
autonomous agencies), the autonomous communities (or regional governments) since their creation after 
the restoration of democracy in 1977, and the benefits of all social insurance programs. Social spending by 
municipal and provincial councils is not included for two reasons. First, the development of social 
spending in Spain was the sole responsibility of central government and the autonomous communities 
that absorbed part of its competences after the restoration of democracy in 1977. Second, the series 
offered by Espuelas (2013) has many gaps in the social spending of municipal and provincial councils that 
entailed an unnecessary loss of information in light of the econometric analysis. Following the previous 
studies of Lindert (2004), the pensions of civil servants have also been excluded from the analysis because 
they do not represent benefits for the whole of the population. Rather, they have been considered the 
result of the particular employment relation between the State and its employees and have therefore been 
treated like the collective insurances offered by many companies to their employees. 
 
At a glance, it is again hard to find a clear pattern between the evolution of social 
spending and the type of political regime. For a more formal analysis of the role of political 
regime in the development of social spending in Spain over the long run, the following 
equation has been estimated:    
 
SS = α0 + β1PR + β2PM + β3Z + ε1    (1) 
 
where SS is Social Spending expressed as a % of GDP; PR is the Political Regime in power 
at each moment; PM is the extent of Political Mobilisation, and Z stands for a set of 
control variables. The data on social spending used here are the ones shown in figure 1. To 
measure the impact of Political Regime, the political history of Spain has been divided into 
several periods based on the definition of democracy provided by Boix et al. (2012). 
According to these authors, a country is democratic if it meets a few minimum 
requirements. It is considered democratic, firstly, if it holds competitive elections (that is, 
if the executive must answer to the voters and if the elections are free, without coercion by 
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the executive or electoral fraud or corruption); and secondly, if at least 50% of the male 
population can vote. From here, they have created a new database with a dichotomous 
indicator on the existence of democracy, which includes 219 countries in the period 1800-
2007. According to their data, Spain has been democratic in the period 1931-36 and from 
1977 to the present. Even though the other periods were not democratic, they were also 
not homogeneous from an institutional viewpoint. Before the First World War, for 
example, Spain had universal male suffrage (although caciquismo, fraud and electoral 
corruption prevent considering it a democracy). Prior to 1890, there was census suffrage 
and after the Spanish civil war, the country was ruled by a military dictatorship.   
For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting to examine whether each of these political 
regimes had a differentiated impact on social spending. Lindert (2004), for instance, notes 
that democracy had a positive impact on social spending, but that the most negative effect 
was not the result of dictatorships but rather of elite democracies (with census suffrage). 
Accordingly, the years in which Spain was not democratic have been divided into three 
periods: the years of census suffrage (when only a small portion of the population was 
allowed to vote); the years of universal male suffrage (when most of the male population 
was allowed to vote, but as noted before the elections were not competitive), and the years 
of dictatorship that followed the military coups of 1923 and 1936-39. In the econometric 
analysis, therefore, three dummy variables have been introduced, taking a value of one in 
the years of universal male suffrage (1868-77; 1890-1922), democracy (1931-36; 1977-2000) 
and dictatorship (1923-30; 1939-76), and taking a value of zero otherwise5. The years of 
census suffrage or elite democracy have been used as a baseline6. 
In addition to political regime, the analysis has included a variable called, for the sake of 
simplicity, Political Mobilisation. The reason for this is that several of the theories 
mentioned in section 2 hold that the political regime is conditioned by the political 
pressure that citizens or given organised groups are able to exert from below. According to 
the power-resource theories, for example, for a democracy to have a positive effect, the 
working class must take advantage of the opportunities afforded to them by democracy 
and vote for left-wing political parties. To test this hypothesis, the analysis has included a 
dummy variable in the years of democracy, taking value one in the years in which there 
were left-wing governments and zero otherwise7. The data come from Linz et al. (2005) 
                                                          
5 The years of the Spanish civil war, 1936-39, have been excluded from the analysis because of the lack of 
data. 
6 The years that are categorised here as dictatorship coincide with the years for which the variable xconst 
(executive constraint), devised by Marshall and Jaggers (2010) as part of the Polity IV project, takes value 
1, that is, when the executive has unlimited authority. The years of dictatorship also coincide with the 
years for which the polity index (also from the Polity IV project) takes the lowest values (-7 in most years). 
In turn, the years of democracy coincide with the years in which the polity index takes the highest values 
(varying between 7 and 10). The remaining years (which are categorised here as census suffrage and male 
suffrage) take intermediate values (varying between -6 and 6). For the econometric analysis, however, 
preference has been given to using the dichotomous variables explained above. The reason for this is that 
the polity index is a continuous variable and this means assuming that the effect of the political regime is 
linear (and in the following order: democracy > census democracy > dictatorship). However, this is not 
necessarily the case (Lindert 2004) and, in any event, it is the hypothesis that this paper wants to test. 
7 Quantitative studies addressing the power-resource hypothesis generally include parties with ties to the 
labour movement (socialists, social democrats, communists, labour parties, etc.) and sometimes also 
include “other” left-wing parties. See, for example, the database prepared by Swank (2013) for the post-
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and the expected sign of this variable is positive. Also, in the years of universal male 
suffrage, the political process was not fully democratic (as noted earlier), but there was a 
certain pluralism and the socialist party was allowed to stand for election. The power-
resource theories refer exclusively to democratic periods. However, as noted in section 2, it 
seems reasonable to assume that social democracy might also have had a positive effect on 
social spending even in periods that were not fully democratic. For this reason, the 
regressions also include the interaction between the variable for universal male suffrage 
and the percentage of the socialist party’s seats in the Spanish parliament in that period. 
The expected sign of this variable is positive. Once again, the data come from Linz et al. 
(2005). 
Lastly, following the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), the political mobilisation of 
opposition groups during the years of dictatorship might potentially have some impact on 
social spending. In the final years of Franco’s dictatorship, opposition movements (among 
which the labour movement played a very significant role) took on growing importance 
(Tusell 2005). Because these movements were underground, however, there is no data to 
determine precisely the extent of political mobilisation, either in the labour movement or 
in the political opposition in general8. To measure government’s response to bottom-up 
pressure, the analysis has used the number of changes of government in the preceding five 
years as an indicator of political instability. The data come from Urquijo (2001). This 
variable, however, does not exclusively reflect the opposition’s ability to mobilise under 
dictatorship. It also reflects possible internal government crises (due to succession crises or 
to external shocks, such as an economic crisis). Nevertheless, these crises are windows of 
opportunity that increase the effective pressure that can be exerted by the opposition 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). As a result, they do not affect the core argument. What is 
relevant here is whether the government increases social spending when it is unstable and 
needs political legitimacy. The expected sign of this variable is positive.    
The control variables include GDP per capita, the percentage of the population over 65 
years old, the degree of trade openness, the level of inequality, and government’s fiscal 
capacity. The figures on GDP per capita come from Prados de la Escosura (2003). The data 
on the percentage of the population over 65 years old come from Nicolau (2005). The 
degree of trade openness is measured as the sum of imports plus exports divided by GDP. 
The figures come from Tena (2005). Inequality figures correspond to the Gini index 
prepared by Prados de la Escosura (2008), and the government’s fiscal capacity has been 
measured by the ratio between the central government’s tax revenues and the outstanding 
public debt (also of the central government). The larger this quotient is, the greater the 
state’s fiscal capacity is understood to be. The expected sign of this variable is, therefore, 
positive. The data come from Comín and Díaz (2005). All the variables are expressed in 
logarithms to derive elasticities.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1950 period. In the Spanish case, all of the left-wing governments that held power in the years of 
democracy enjoyed the support or presence of the socialist party. As a result, there is no difference here. 
8 Given the lack of information, one possible alternative would be the number of strikes. However, from 
the end of the civil war to 1963, there is no statistical information on strikes either. After the war, the 
dictatorship punished strikes as crimes of sedition, and were not decriminalised until the nineteen-sixties 
–and only if they called for economic demands- (Maluquer de Motes and Llonch 2005). 
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4.2. Results  
Since the analysis involves time series, before moving onto the regression analysis, it has 
first been tested whether or not the time series are stationary. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test have been applied to the series included in the 
model. The results appear in table 1. As can be seen, the series are not stationary. All of 
them are integrated series of order one, I (1). Then, it has been tested whether the series 
are cointegrated. To do this, the Engle-Granger cointegration test has been applied to the 
residuals of the OLS estimation in table 3. The results of the Engle-Granger cointegration 
test appear in table 2. As can be seen, they confirm that the series are cointegrated. When 
the series are cointegrated, the OLS estimator is consistent, but it presents problems of 
asymptotic bias and is not an efficient estimator. Therefore, in order to give robustness to 
the analysis, the results are presented not only for the Least Squares estimation, but also 
for the estimations obtained using Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully Modified 
Least Squares (FMOLS). Both of these methods can deal with possible problems deriving 
from the existence of a cointegration relation. The first method does so by including lags 
and leads of the stochastic regressors in differences, while the second uses a semi-
parametric correction of the least-squares estimator (Stock and Watson 1993, Phillips and 
Hansen 1990). Both estimators are equivalent and asymptotically efficient. The results of 
the regressions appear in table 3. 
 
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 
 
As can be seen, the control variables are significant and, in general, have the expected 
sign. The ageing of the population, for example, presents a positive and statistically 
significant sign, in line with the studies of Lindert (2004) and Mulligan et al. (2010). GDP 
per capita, by contrast, presents a negative sign. To some extent, this might be explained 
by the fact that in the early years of the sample and particularly in the final decades, GDP 
rose continuously while social spending remained rather stable. In this respect, it seems 
that the effect of modernisation is captured in the regressions by the ageing of the 
population (which is, in part, a by-product of economic growth). With respect to the effect 
of inequality, the results show a negative correlation with social spending. This suggests 
that the median voter models do not hold in the long run, and confirms the findings of 
recent research suggesting that inequality prevents social spending growth (Barth and 
Moene 2015, Espuelas 2015, Gärtner and Prado 2016). The degree of trade openness, for 
its part, shows a positive sign. Apparently, the demand effect proposed by Rodrik (1997) 
predominated over the race to the bottom effect, confirming the results by Sáenz et al. 
(2013) also for Spain in the period 1960-2000. 
As for the political variables, the results show that the introduction of universal male 
suffrage in 1890 had a gross negative effect. However, the coefficient associated with the 
percentage of the socialist party’s seats has a positive sign, which is significant in all 
equations and greater than the negative coefficient of male suffrage. Taking into account 
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that this variable is a percentage that ranges between 0 and 100, the size of the coefficient 
indicates that the negative effect of universal male suffrage would be offset by less than 
1% of the seats being occupied by social democrats. These results confirm that caciquismo, 
corruption and electoral fraud were successful in neutralising the potential positive effect 
of universal male suffrage. But, at the same time, they suggest that even in a fraudulent 
system like that of the Bourbon Restoration, political leaders were not entirely immune to 
demands from below. To the contrary, the results indicate that the political elite became 
willing to make social concessions in the face of the electoral advance of social democracy 
(despite the latter never rose above a very low level of representation). This confirms the 
importance that qualitative studies have placed on the rise of the labour movement in the 
beginnings of social policy in Spain (Gabriel 2004, Castillo and Montero 2008). Also, this 
concurs with the results of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), which show how public investment in 
roads in the period 1880-1914 was partly motivated by the government’s pursuit of 
political stability. Indeed, the gradual (and small) increase in electoral representation of 
Spanish social democracy after 1910 coincided with a period of increased social unrest. In 
that sense, it is likely that the positive statistical effect of social democracy is, in fact, 
capturing the elite reaction to that increase in political instability (and not only the effect 
of the electoral growth of social democracy).9 
Democracy, for its part, has a clearly positive effect on social spending. The size of the 
coefficient associated with this variable is significant and much greater than in the case of 
male suffrage and the dictatorship. The results, therefore, indicate that the extension of 
voting rights to the whole of the population had a positive impact on social spending 
growth. At the same time, the coefficient associated with the dictatorship variable is not 
statistically significant, which indicates that its impact on social policy was similar to that 
of the years of census suffrage or elite democracy (our baseline period). By contrast, the 
number of government changes in the years of dictatorship does have a positive effect and 
is statistically significant. This suggests that dictatorships responded to political 
instability with rises in social spending. However, the size of the coefficient is much 
smaller than that of the democracy variable. Therefore, the positive effect of political 
instability falls far short of offsetting the negative effect that derives from the absence of 
democracy. This confirms Espuelas’ (2012) results, who also found a negative impact of 
southern European dictatorships on social spending, but using panel data instead of time 
series. 
Lastly, the results show that, unlike what happened in the period of the Bourbon 
Restoration, the presence of left-wing parties in government during the years of democracy 
did not have any significant effect on social spending. This is partly explained by the 
arrival of democracy per se, which obliged all parties to take into account the preferences 
of all voters (including low-income voters). By contrast, it is reasonable to assume that 
before the advent of democracy left-wing parties were the ones that (for ideological 
reasons) most took into account the preferences of low-income groups. Also, the emergence 
of the Keynesian consensus in Europe after the Second World War further helped to blur 
the distinctions among parties on the left and right of the political spectrum (Hicks 1999). 
                                                          
9 The problem when it comes to distinguish between the effect of the electoral growth of social democracy 
and that of increased social unrest is that there is no data, starting in 1850, to control for the latter. In 
any case, both aspects were in fact the result of the same process, which is the political crisis of the 
Bourbon Restoration period. 
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In Spain, the (belated) equivalent of the Keynesian consensus came with the Moncloa 
Pacts of 1977, in which the main political parties agreed, as noted earlier, to implement a 
policy of wage moderation and inflation control in return for a progressive fiscal reform 
and the expansion of social policy. As a result, social spending began to grow rapidly from 
the outset of democracy, including the first centre-right governments of the UCD party 
(Union of the Democratic Centre) and later socialist governments (1982-96). 
 
[Table 4] 
 
At the same time, since the end of the nineteen-eighties (during the industrial 
restructuring) and above all since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93, 
socialist governments and centre-right governments of the Partido Popular (1996-2000) 
have put greater priority on policies to control the public deficit and inflation than on the 
expansion of social spending. In the years of the Second Republic, however, the qualitative 
evidence suggests that the consensus in favour of social policy was smaller and that the 
socialist party (together with other left-wing parties) actually went to great lengths to put 
social issues at the centre of the political agenda (Samaniego 1988). To test this possibility, 
the regressions in table 3 have been repeated, but this time including a multiplicative 
variable for the years of the Second Republic. The results appear in table 4, but they must 
be interpreted with caution because this period was very short and, therefore, there are 
few available observations. As can be seen, the left-wing governments during the Second 
Republic effectively had a positive impact on social spending. This seems to confirm, as 
suggested by Hicks (1999), that the role of social democracy was more significant before 
the so-called Keynesian consensus. 
The results shown so far indicate that democracy had a positive effect on social spending 
in Spain. However, one potential concern when analysing the relation between the 
political regime and social spending arises with the possible issue of endogeneity. To the 
extent that social spending contributes to political stability, it might condition the type of 
political regime. At the same time, Boix (2003) considers that if there are many 
redistributive pressures, high-income groups can prefer nondemocratic regimes. Both 
cases would raise an issue of inverse causality. There might also be a problem of omitted 
variables affecting the coefficients of the variables of interest.  To make the analysis more 
robust, the estimations in table 3 have been repeated, but this time using instrumental 
variables. The results appear in table 5. As instruments for the political regime (which, in 
this case, are three variables: democracy, dictatorship and universal male suffrage), I have 
used the percentage of the working-age population that has completed secondary 
education and the type of political regime (democracy, dictatorship and universal male 
suffrage) in other southern European countries: Italy, Greece and Portugal10. In column 1. 
                                                          
10 As in the Spanish case, each of these countries has been classified as democratic following Boix et al. 
(2012). As for the remaining years, they have been classified as “dictatorship” for those years in which the 
variable xconst of Marshall and Jaggers (2010) takes a value of 1 and as “universal male suffrage” for 
those years in which the right to vote formally existed but Boix et al. (2012) do not consider them fully 
democratic periods. The figures for the percentage of working-age population with secondary education or 
greater have been calculated from Núñez (2005); since 1964 they have been linked to the series provided 
by IVIE (2014). 
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I have instrumented simultaneously for the three variables relating to political regime 
(democracy, dictatorship and universal male suffrage). In columns 2 through 4, I have 
instrumented for each of these variables individually (the instrument used for democracy 
has been democracy in southern Europe and the completion rate for secondary education; 
for dictatorship, dictatorship in southern Europe and the completion rate for secondary 
education; and for male suffrage, male suffrage in southern Europe and completion rate 
for secondary education). In all of the regressions (from columns 1 to 4), a redundancy test 
has been applied. The instruments that did not pass the test were eliminated from the 
regressions. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
The reason to use these instruments is that the political and institutional context of the 
other countries of southern Europe is likely to have conditioned the evolution of the 
political regime in Spain, for example, through an imitation effect or diplomatic pressures. 
However, there is no apparent reason to assume that social spending in Spain had any 
impact on the political regime existing in other countries. Similarly, it is possible that 
demands for democratisation increase if the adult population has a higher level of 
education, but current social spending cannot have a significant influence on the current 
stock of education, which depends on decisions taken many years earlier. Nor is there any 
theoretical reason to expect that the political regime of a neighbouring country or growth 
in the stock of human capital per se will cause a rise or fall in social spending. In addition, 
as table 5 shows, the instruments are reasonably strong. The first-stage F-statistic is 
above 10 in all of the equations. In equations 1 and 3, where the number of instruments 
exceeds the number of regressors, the p-values from the Sargan test are clearly greater 
than 0.1. This indicates that there is no evidence that the instruments are correlated with 
the error term.  
With respect to the results, the size and sign of the coefficients of the variables of interest 
are similar to those in table 3. Democracy has a positive and highly significant effect on 
social spending; universal male suffrage (in a context that cannot be considered fully 
democratic) has an initially negative effect that becomes easily offset by the socialist 
party’s parliamentary seats, and dictatorship has no statistically significant effect. It 
seems, therefore, that the results using instrumental variables confirm the results 
obtained using least squares. Indeed, according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity 
test, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous. 
This is not entirely surprising if we take into account that, as noted earlier, both high and 
low levels of social spending in Spain occurred under democratic and nondemocratic 
regimes. 
 
4.3. Political Regime and Long-Term Trends  
The analysis presented so far, based on dummy variables, captures the “average” impact of 
each political regime, once we have taken into account the effect of the control variables. 
However, when one looks at the evolution of social spending over the long run, one does 
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not see a steady trend with (more or less abrupt) step changes associated with changes in 
the political regime. Instead, in the Spanish case one can observe two clearly differentiated 
patterns or social spending regimes, along with a long transition process between them 
(figure 1). The first regime, which could be called the traditional regime, is characterised 
by low levels of social spending, and covers the time-period between 1850 and the 
nineteen-thirties. The second regime, or modern regime, extends from the nineteen-
seventies to the present day and is characterised by high levels of social spending. This 
long-term pattern is partly determined by the cumulative nature of social policy. In Spain, 
as in many European countries, the growth in social spending over time is explained by 
the gradual introduction of new social programmes, often in an ad hoc and piecemeal way. 
Also, in countries like Spain in which the development of social policy was based on the 
creation of Bismarckian social insurances, the first social programmes were often limited 
to certain segments of the population, typically industrial workers with medium or low 
income. In this way, the growth in social spending can also be explained by the gradual 
expansion of coverage to the entirety of the population and by the improved generosity of 
social benefits.  
In the Spanish case, however, the transition process from the traditional regime to the 
modern regime of social spending was not linear, but went through periods of stagnation 
and of rapid growth. It is interesting, therefore, to ask what impact the political regime 
had on the transition process. Indeed, in the context of this transition from a traditional 
regime with low social spending to another with high social spending, one would expect 
the impact (if any) of the political regime to consist primarily in changes in the long-run 
growth trend and not so much in changes in levels. To test this possibility, the regressions 
in table 3 have been repeated with the inclusion of a dummy variable (taking value 1 for 
the post-1931 period and zero for the preceding years), and also a time trend for the post-
1931 period (which takes value 1 in 1931, increases linearly in the subsequent years, and 
takes value zero prior to 1931). It should be recalled that 1931 saw the proclamation of the 
Second Republic, Spain’s first democratic regime. Therefore, with these variables, the aim 
is to capture the potential change in trend and levels associated with the arrival of 
democracy. Together with these variables, it has been also included a time trend for the 
post-1931 period, squared. The reason for this is that one would expect the rate of growth 
to moderate once high levels of social spending have been achieved (that is, once the 
transition from the traditional regime to the modern regime of social spending is 
complete). Lastly, to capture the effect of Franco’s dictatorship, the regressions also 
include the interaction between the years of Francoist dictatorship and the post-1931 
dummy variable as well as the interaction between the Francoist dictatorship and the 
post-1931 trend. The results appear in table 6. 
 
[Table 6] 
 
As can be seen, both the post-1931 dummy variable and the post-1931 time trend have a 
positive and statistically significant effect. As one would expect, the square of the post-
1931 time trend, for its part, shows a negative and statistically significant sign. This 
suggests that the arrival of democracy in Spain not only entailed an increase in the levels 
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of social spending, but also caused a change in its long run trend, accelerating the growth 
rate of social spending. Subsequently, once high levels of social spending had been 
reached, the growth rate again levelled out. With respect to the role of the dictatorship, the 
interaction between the years of dictatorship and the post-1931 dummy variable is not 
statistically significant. However, the interaction between the dictatorship and the post-
1931 time trend has a negative sign and is statistically significant. Rather than an abrupt 
return to the pre-1931 levels, the negative effect of the dictatorship consisted in reversing 
the acceleration in social spending initiated in 1931. In other words, Franco’s dictatorship 
halted the modernisation process (the transition from the traditional regime to the modern 
regime of social spending) that began with the arrival of democracy in 1931.  
This, in turn, suggests that the best way to analyse the impact of the political regime on 
the evolution of social spending does not always involve analysing the changes occurring in 
the years immediately before or after a regime change. As has been seen, the effect can be 
more gradual than an abrupt step change. Guillén (1992), for instance, found that, 
although “these regime changes [occurring in Spain] would lead one to expect radical 
discontinuities” (p. 119), “the most salient feature of social policy during the Spanish 
transition to democracy was its high degree of continuity” (p. 137). By taking a broader 
perspective, however, one can much better appreciate the effect of the regime change and, 
in this case, the negative impact of Franco’s dictatorship. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although the importance of political factors for the growth of social spending has 
sometimes been denied, the results of the Spanish case show that they were indeed 
important. In Spain, democracy had a clearly positive effect on both the levels of social 
spending and its long-term growth trend. The arrival of democracy in 1931 saw the 
beginning of a modernisation process that involved a shift from a traditional regime of 
social spending (characterised by very low levels of social spending) to a modern regime of 
social spending (with high levels of social spending). This process of transformation, 
however, was interrupted by Franco’s dictatorship, which reversed the change in trend 
initiated in 1931 and slowed the ultimate growth in social spending. The dictatorship did 
not force a sudden return to pre-1931 levels. Rather, as noted earlier, it curbed the growth 
in social spending initiated previously. This means that the negative effect of the 
dictatorship on the levels of the social spending would only become visible after some time. 
This, in turn, would help to explain why some studies have failed to identify the negative 
effect of dictatorships (and not only in Spain). If instead of taking a long-term perspective 
such as the one used in this paper, the analysis adopts a perspective that is too short-term, 
it is possible to do not capture this negative effect. The results from this study also show 
that analysing changes in the long run trends instead of only changes in levels can be 
useful to understand the true nature of the impact of the type of political regime on social 
spending.   
The results of the regressions show other interesting nuances about the role of political 
factors. Political instability during the years of dictatorship gave rise to modest increases 
in social spending, although they were entirely insufficient to offset the negative effect of 
the lack of democracy. On the other hand, the introduction of universal male suffrage in 
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the late nineteenth century (in a context of caciquismo and widespread electoral fraud) 
had no positive effect on social spending. What did have a positive effect, by contrast, was 
the weak electoral growth of social democracy (and more generally the growth of the 
labour movement and social unrest) in this same nondemocratic context. Apparently, the 
political elite of the Bourbon Restoration were reacting, at least partly, to demands from 
below, although the levels of social spending remained very low throughout the entire 
period. During the years of democracy, by contrast, left-wing governments are observed to 
have had no significant effect on social spending (with the exception perhaps of the 
nineteen-thirties). This is explained partly by the effect of democracy per se (which obliged 
all parties to take into account the preferences of all citizens), but also by the emergence of 
the Keynesian consensus (whose belated equivalent in Spain came with the Moncloa Pacts 
of 1977). As a result, the role of left-wing parties was certainly more visible in the 
nineteen-thirties (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the Bourbon Restoration (when 
the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored). 
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Tables 
Table 1. Unit root tests (in levels and differences) 
Test specification: constant Test specification: trend and constant 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test  
Phillips-Perron 
test  
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
test  
Phillips-Perron 
test  
Variables t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic 
In levels                  
Log(social spending) -0.060  0.050  -1.849  -2.039  
Log(GDP per capita) 1.706  2.076  -0.467  -0.269  
Log(population 65) 3.711  3.278  0.164  -0.259  
Log(Gini) -2.545  -2.446  -2.535  -2.437  
Log(openness) -2.108  -2.049  -2.694  -2.600  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -0.840  -0.743  -1.761  -1.580  
    
In differences     
Log(social spending) -16.243***  -17.229***  -16.217***  -17.362***  
Log(GDP per capita) -9.589***  -9.589***  -9.920***  -9.896***  
Log(population 65) -14.610***  -14.558***  -15.728***  -15.238***  
Log(Gini) -14.349***  -14.438***  -14.302***  -14.392***  
Log(openness) -10.241***  -13.403***  -10.265***  -13.397***  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -8.823***  -8.851***    -8.794***  -8.823***  
Null hypothesis: the variable has a unit root, * rejection at 10%, ** rejection at 5%, *** rejection at 1%. 
Sources: see text. 
 
Table 2. Engle-Granger cointegration test 
Model specification t-statistic 
 
    constant 
 
-10.358*** 
 
trend and constant -10.407*** 
 Note: test from the regressions shown in table 3. 
Null hypothesis: series are not cointegrated, *** rejection at 1%.  
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Table 3. Political regime and social spending in Spain (1850-2000) 
          Dep. variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
          Male suffrage -0.472 [0.098] *** -0.571 [0.129] *** -0.525 [0.096] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.688 [0.172] *** 0.572 [0.282] ** 0.709 [0.168] *** 
Democracy 1.874 [0.243] *** 1.753 [0.353] *** 1.842 [0.239] *** 
Democracy * left government 0.088 [0.107]  0.096 [0.157]  0.119 [0.104]  
Dictatorship 0.357 [0.224]  0.160 [0.336]  0.326 [0.219]  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.370 [0.058] *** 0.468 [0.115] *** 0.406 [0.057] *** 
 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.694 [0.290] *** -1.875 [0.388] *** -1.913 [0.280] *** 
Log(population 65) 1.841 [0.695] *** 2.846 [0.961] *** 2.313 [0.690] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.696 [0.259] *** -0.895 [0.382] ** -0.744 [0.257] *** 
Log(openness) 0.360 [0.119] *** 0.115 [0.186] 
 
0.308 [0.118] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -0.006 [0.083] 
 
-0.008 [0.125] 
 
-0.003 [0.081] 
 Constant 12.383 [2.923] *** 13.680 [3.877] *** 14.458 [2.824] *** 
Time-trend 0.016 [0.006] ** 0.016 [0.009] * 0.017 [0.006] ** 
          Adjusted R-squared 0.990 
  
0.993 
  
0.991 
  S.E. of regression 0.263 
  
0.221 
  
0.257 
  
Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: estimation method is OLS in column 1, Dynamic Least Squares in column 2, and Fully Modified Least Squares in column 3. All regressions include a time-dummy for the 
period after the Spanish Civil War. Espuelas (2013) warns that there is a jump in his social spending series in 1967 due to problems in the original sources. To control for it, I 
have included a time-dummy for the period after that year. The main results remain when removing one or both of these time-dummies, although the general fit of the 
regressions decreases. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Left-wing governments’ impact before the Spanish civil war 
          Dependent variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
          Male suffrage -0.434 [0.096] *** -0.447 [0.125] *** -0.485 [0.091] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.699 [0.167] *** 0.571 [0.260] ** 0.699 [0.158] *** 
Democracy 1.659 [0.245] *** 1.409 [0.351] *** 1.644 [0.234] *** 
Democracy * left government -0.031 [0.111]  0.027 [0.149]  0.030 [0.104]  
2nd republic * left government 0.811 [0.257] *** 1.699 [0.578] *** 0.787 [0.243] *** 
Dictatorship 0.353 [0.217]  0.206 [0.320]  0.308 [0.207]  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.312 [0.059] *** 0.370 [0.124] *** 0.345 [0.056] *** 
 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.530 [0.286] *** -1.337 [0.417] *** -1.743 [0.270] *** 
Log(population 65) 2.238 [0.685] *** 3.047 [0.875] *** 2.548 [0.664] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.644 [0.251] ** -0.442 [0.382] 
 
-0.637 [0.244] ** 
Log(openness) 0.290 [0.118] ** 0.066 [0.178] 
 
0.240 [0.114] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.049 [0.082] 
 
0.121 [0.124] 
 
0.063 [0.078] 
 Constant 10.299 [2.904] *** 8.043 [4.325] * 12.587 [2.742] *** 
Time-trend 0.011 [0.006] * 0.003 [0.010] 
 
0.012 [0.006] ** 
          Adjusted R-squared 0.991 
  
0.994 
  
0.991 
  S.E. of regression 0.255 
  
0.212 
  
0.247 
  
Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: For estimation methods see notes to table 3. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. Instrumental Variable regressions 
                      
Dep. variable: Log(social spending) (1) 
 
 (2) 
 
 (3) 
 
 (4) 
 
 
                      
Male suffrage -0.311 (0.185) * -0.482 (0.135) *** -0.438 (0.128) *** -0.643 (0.296) ** 
Democracy 1.864 (0.394) *** 1.827 (0.515) *** 1.997 (0.392) *** 1.651 (0.433) *** 
Dictatorship 0.461 (0.379)  0.322 (0.399)  0.498 (0.424)  0.144 (0.409)  
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.635 (0.217) *** 0.670 (0.236) *** 0.750 (0.229) *** 0.657 (0.173) *** 
Democracy * left government 0.111 (0.111)  0.093 (0.111)  0.086 (0.102)  0.100 (0.105)  
Dictatorship*government turnover 0.345 (0.072) *** 0.368 (0.059) *** 0.362 (0.059) *** 0.369 (0.056) *** 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.470 (0.333) *** -1.680 (0.307) *** -1.719 (0.283) *** -1.796 (0.325) *** 
Log(population 65) 1.925 (0.827) ** 1.783 (0.866) ** 2.067 (0.882) ** 1.552 (0.817) * 
Log(Gini) -0.603 (0.275) ** -0.701 (0.249) *** -0.702 (0.246) *** -0.804 (0.304) *** 
Log(openness) 0.263 (0.140) * 0.354 (0.127) *** 0.373 (0.118) *** 0.407 (0.138) *** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.056 (0.095)  -0.006 (0.079)  -0.009 (0.079)  -0.053 (0.110)  
Constant 10.068 (3.329) *** 12.276 (2.905) *** 12.35 (2.773) *** 13.57 (3.427) *** 
Time-trend 0.012 (0.009)  0.017 (0.010) * 0.014 (0.009)  0.023 (0.012) * 
Instrumented Male suffrage        --        -- Male suffrage 
 
Democracy Democracy        --        -- 
  Dictatorship        -- Dictatorship        -- 
Instruments 
Male suffrage  
(southern Europe) 
 
  
 
  
 Male suffrage  
(southern Europe) 
 
 
Democracy  
(southern Europe) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Dictatorship  
(southern Europe) 
 
  
 Dictatorship  
(southern Europe) 
 
  
 
  
Secondary 
school completion 
 Secondary 
school completion 
 Secondary 
school completion 
 
    
 
F-statistic, first stage 11.220 
 
 33.065 
 
 22.059 
 
 14.874 
 
 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.209 
 
 -- 
 
 0.883 
 
 -- 
 
 
DWH test (p-value) 0.629 
 
 0.918 
 
 0.699 
 
 0.536 
 
 
Observations 147 
 
 147 
 
 147 
 
 147 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Political regime and long-term trends in social spending (1850-2000) 
Dependent variable: Log(social spending) OLS     DOLS     FMOLS     
Post-1931 dummy 2.062 [0.274] *** 1.905 [0.300] *** 2.018 [0.251] *** 
Post-1931 trend 0.058 [0.014] *** 0.037 [0.017] ** 0.050 [0.013] *** 
Post-1931 trend squared -.0004 [0.000] ** -.0001 [0.000] 
 
-.0003 [0.000] * 
Post-1931 dummy*dictatorship 0.596 [0.472] 
 
0.444 [0.689] 
 
0.629 [0.443] 
 Post-1931 trend*dictatorship -0.041 [0.011] *** -0.034 [0.016] ** -0.041 [0.010] *** 
          Male suffrage -0.387 [0.096] *** -0.413 [0.111] *** -0.410 [0.087] *** 
Male suffrage * socialist MPs 0.667 [0.173] *** 0.372 [0.248] 
 
0.650 [0.158] *** 
Democracy * left government 0.054 [0.104] 
 
-0.089 [0.135] 
 
0.070 [0.094] 
 Dictatorship 0.331 [0.219] 
 
0.029 [0.267] 
 
0.316 [0.200] 
 Dictatorship*government turnover 0.264 [0.068] *** 0.378 [0.112] *** 0.296 [0.062] *** 
          Log(GDP per capita) -1.341 [0.423] *** -1.489 [0.594] ** -1.449 [0.386] *** 
Log(population 65) 1.866 [0.692] *** 2.752 [0.802] *** 2.187 [0.643] *** 
Log(Gini) -0.397 [0.259] 
 
-0.376 [0.352] 
 
-0.406 [0.242] * 
Log(openness) 0.364 [0.145] ** -0.017 [0.222] 
 
0.342 [0.133] ** 
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) 0.115 [0.097] 
 
0.252 [0.132] * 0.145 [0.088] 
 Constant 8.814 [4.936] * 10.777 [6.876] 
 
9.795 [4.520] ** 
Time-trend 0.008 [0.008] 
 
0.008 [0.010] 
 
0.008 [0.008] 
 
          Adjusted R-squared 0.991 
  
0.994 
  
0.992 
  S.E. of regression 0.252 
  
0.211 
  
0.244 
  Obs.  147     147     147     
Note: For estimation methods see notes to table 3. Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
